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INTRODUCTION
Until the late twentieth century, the most rigorously traditional
Jews, Haredi Jews (often referred to as “ultra-Orthodox”), tended to
congregate in New York City. 1 As the price of living in New York
increased and the Haredi population grew, 2 many Haredi Jews
(known collectively as “Haredim”) 3 moved to small towns and
suburbs in search of cheaper land to establish predominantly Haredi
towns, such as Kiryas Joel, New York and Lakewood, New Jersey. 4
As Haredi populations continue to grow, their communities are
seeking more undeveloped land to expand existing Haredi enclaves. 5
However, as Haredim move deeper into the countryside, zoning
conflicts have multiplied; residents of nearby rural and suburban
towns often do not want densely-populated Haredi settlements nearby
and seek land use regulations that will keep Haredim away. 6 This
article suggests that Haredi communities can avoid such conflicts
through a “smart growth” strategy 7: towns such as Lakewood can
zone for more dense housing in the centers of their towns, thus
reducing the need for expansion into other towns.
Part I of this Article discusses the growth and widespread
expansion of suburban Haredi communities. 8 Part II suggests that a
“smart growth” strategy of funneling growth into existing Haredi
towns might benefit Haredim by reducing the frequency of zoning

*

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Associate Professor, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; Director,
Institute on Land Use and Sustainable Development. B.A., Wesleyan University; J.D.,
University of Pennsylvania; L.L.M., University of Toronto. I would like to thank my
wife Helen for suggesting this topic, and for her “insider knowledge” about the places
I write about in this article. I also thank John Echeverria and Itzchak Kornfeld for
their helpful comments.
See infra notes 11–26 and accompanying text (describing Haredim and Haredidominated parts of Brooklyn).
See infra notes 27–41 and accompanying text (summarizing the history of Haredim
moving out of New York and relocating to smaller towns and suburbs).
See generally MENACHEM FRIEDMAN & SAMUEL C. HEILMAN, THE HAREDIM IN
ISRAEL: WHO ARE THEY AND WHAT DO THEY WANT? (1996) (providing background
information on Haredi culture).
See infra notes 25–40 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 25–40 and accompanying text (describing the expansion of Haredi
communities outside New York City).
See infra notes 41–60 and accompanying text (outlining examples of land disputes
stemming from Haredi settlements).
See infra notes 105–17 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.
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conflicts with non-Haredim. 9 Part III suggests some zoning reforms
that would promote this smart growth strategy. 10
I.

BACKGROUND: HAREDIM AND THEIR GROWTH

The leading denominations of American Jewry are Orthodox,
Conservative, and Reform Judaism. 11 Orthodox Jews follow
traditional Jewish law, as interpreted by rabbis for centuries. 12 For
example, Orthodox Jews who follow these laws do not work, drive,
write, or make phone calls on the Jewish Sabbath. 13 Within
Orthodoxy, one major distinction is between modern Orthodox Jews
and Haredi Jews. Modern Orthodox Jews follow traditional Jewish
law but seek to harmonize Orthodoxy with modern life; for example,
modern Orthodox Jews tend to wear “modern attire” and “go into the
professions.” 14 The term “Haredim” is a Hebrew term, meaning
“those who tremble before God.” 15 Haredi Jews stay more distant
from modern life; they are more likely than modern Orthodox Jews
to avoid television, radio, and the integration of the sexes in their
schools. 16 They are also less likely to attend secular universities, 17
and they often wear distinctive attire. 18
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
The Jewish Denominations: A Quick Look at Reform, Conservative, Orthodox and
Reconstructive Judaism—and at Other Jewish Streams, MY JEWISH LEARNING
[hereinafter The Jewish Denominations] https://www.myjewishlearning.com/
article/the-jewish-denominations/ [https://perma.cc/2HSA-N63D] (last visited July
13, 2021).
Id.; see also Lydia M. Belzer, Toward True Shalom Bayit: Acknowledging Domestic
Abuse in the Jewish Community and What to Do About It, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J.
241, 243 (2005) (describing Orthodoxy in more detail).
VIRTUAL
LIBR.,
See
Shabbat:
What
Is
Shabbat?,
JEWISH
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/what-is-shabbat-jewish-sabbath
[https://perma.cc/DW5E-L4QM] (last visited July 16, 2021) (explaining the Jewish
Sabbath occurs from Friday night to Saturday night); see also Aaron R. Petty, “Faith,
However Defined”: Reassessing JFS and the Judicial Conception of Religion, 6 ELON
L. REV. 117, 132 (2014) (noting that Orthodox Jews do not write on the Sabbath).
Ranaan Geberer, Opinion, ‘Ultra-Orthodox Jews’: Who are They?, BROOKLYN DAILY
EAGLE (Mar. 27, 2013), https://brooklyneagle.com/articles/2013/03/27/opinion-ultraorthodox-jews-who-are-they/ [ https://perma.cc/GRG8-JZZY].
AYALA FADER, MITZVAH GIRLS: BRINGING UP THE NEXT GENERATION OF HASIDIC
JEWS IN BROOKLYN 13 (2009).
See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 691 (1994)
(For example, Satmar Hasidim “segregate the sexes outside the home; speak Yiddish
as their primary language; eschew television, radio, and English-language
publications; and dress in distinctive ways that include head coverings and special
garments for boys and modest dresses for girls.”).
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Haredim fall into two major camps: Hasidic and Yeshivish. 19
Hasidic Jews are divided into a variety of sects, all of which arise
from an eighteenth century mystical movement that emphasized
fervent prayer. 20 Yeshivish (or “Litvish”) 21 Jews are the intellectual
heirs of other European rabbis who emphasized Jewish scholarship
more than the Hasidim. 22 Most Hasidic sects are led by a rabbi
known as a “rebbe”; 23 the most prestigious Litvish leaders often head
yeshivas (institutions of advanced Jewish study). 24
Most Haredim are descendants of Jews who came from eastern
Europe to the United States after the Holocaust. 25 Haredim originally
moved to Brooklyn; leading Hasidic neighborhoods include
Williamsburg, Crown Heights, and Borough Park, while Litvish Jews
are concentrated in Midwood and Kensington. 26 But some Haredim
have moved to suburbs, apparently because of New York’s exploding
housing costs. 27 Between 2006 and 2018, real median rent increased
by twenty percent in Midwood and twenty-nine percent in Borough

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

See Stephen H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and the Tragedy of Sexual Abuse of Children
— The Dilemma Within the Orthodox Jewish Community, 13 RUTGERS J.L. &
RELIGION 281, 284 (2012).
See The Jewish Denominations, supra note 11.
Id.
Id.
See FADER, supra note 15, at 8 (describing the origins of “Litvish” as the name for
Lithuanian Jews).
Id.; see also The Jewish Denominations, supra note 11.
FADER, supra note 15, at 8.
Id. (explaining Litvish believed “religious authority should come from scholars in
[institutions of learning called] yeshivas” while Hasidim relied on charismatic leaders
known as “rebbes”).
See id.
See John Mangin, Ethnic Enclaves and the Zoning Game, 36 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
419, 434–37 (describing how the Satmar Hasidic sect moved to South Williamsburg
while other Hasidim moved to Borough Park); Molly Boigon, Here’s How to Think
About NYC’s New COVID-19 Data, FORWARD (May 27, 2020),
https://forward.com/news/447380/nyc-coronavirus-data-haredi-hasidic-visualizationscharts-graphs-maps/ [https://perma.cc/2VRT-SB7R] (leading Haredi neighborhoods
are Williamsburg, Borough Park, and Crown Heights in Brooklyn); FADER, supra
note 15, at 13 (explaining that Litvish Jews are also concentrated in Brooklyn areas of
Kensington and Midwood.).
See Gil Shefler, Turf Battles Follow Haredi Population Surge in New York, THE
TIMES OF ISRAEL (Feb. 19, 2013, 5:25 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/turfbattles-follow-haredi-population-surge-in-ny/ [https://perma.cc/R9U2-YZSR] (“The
tough real estate market has enticed many Haredim to leave [Brooklyn] for Jewish
towns farther upstate . . . .”).
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Park. 28 Some of the Haredim priced out of Brooklyn have moved to
create their own towns at the edge of suburbia and beyond. 29 As early
as the 1950s, some Skver Hasidim moved to the upstate suburbs to
create New Square, which was later incorporated as a village. 30 A
few decades later, Satmar Hasidim created their own village in
Orange County, New York, named Kiryas Joel. 31 The boundaries of
this municipality are drawn to include 320 acres owned entirely by
28.

29.
30.

31.

Borough Park BK12, NYU FURMAN CTR.: NEW YORK NEIGHBORHOOD DATA
PROFILES,
https://furmancenter.org/neighborhoods/view/borough-park
[https://perma.cc/DRR6-U6ZL] (last visited July 11, 2021) (“[M]edian gross rent in
Borough Park increased from $1,230 in 2006 to $1,610 in 2019.”); Flatbush/Midwood
BK14, NYU FURMAN CTR.: NEW YORK NEIGHBORHOOD DATA PROFILES,
https://furmancenter.org/neighborhoods/view/flatbush-midwood
[https://perma.cc/QXA4-YA25] (last visited July 11, 2021) (In Midwood and nearby
Flatbush, real median gross rent “increased from $1,190 in 2006 to $1,510 in 2019.”).
One possible cause of this trend is increased housing costs citywide. See Ingrid Gould
Ellen & Brian Karfunkel, Renting in America’s Largest Metropolitan Areas, NYU
FURMAN CTR. (March 8, 2016), http://furmancenter.org/research/publication/rentingin-americas-largest-metropolitan-areas [https://perma.cc/FA6L-3MP9] (Between 2006
and 2014, citywide rents rose by eleven percent.). Another factor might be increased
demand arising from Haredi population growth. Haredi families average six or seven
children, and the Jewish population of Haredi neighborhoods have increased as a
result. See Viva Hammer, Blessed with Children, JEWISH ACTION,
https://jewishaction.com/jewish-world/blessed-with-children/ [https://perma.cc/2N9BYEQ7] (last visited July 11, 2021) (As of 2001, the average Litvish family had 6.6
children and the average Hasidic family had 7.91, more than twice the birth rate of
modern Orthodox households.); Shefler, supra note 27 (“About 74,500 Jews —
mostly Haredim — lived [in Williamsburg] in 2011, up from 52,700 a decade earlier.
The fastest-growing Jewish neighborhood of the city was Borough Park, another
Haredi stronghold in Brooklyn. More than 130,000 Jews lived there in 2011, up from
76,000 in 2001.”).
See Shefler, supra note 27.
See Gerald Benjamin, The Chassidic Presence and Local Government in the Hudson
Valley, 80 ALB. L. REV. 1383, 1391 (2016–2017) (Skver Hasidim purchased a farm in
1954 on current site of the village and began to settle there in 1956.); David B. Green,
Cult-like Home to Skver Hasidim in N.Y. Holds First Mayoral Election, HAARETZ
(Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.haaretz.com/jewish/cult-like-hasidic-town-holds-firstmayoral-election-1.5464037 [https://perma.cc/4D9P-B4VG] (describing New
Square). In New York, a group of citizens may vote to create a municipality known as
a “village” within a larger suburban municipality known as a “town.” See Benjamin,
supra, at 1388–89 (noting that existence of villages facilitates “the delivery of a more
extensive array of public services than towns were authorized by law to provide in
more densely settled enclaves” in rural and suburban New York, and adding that any
group of over five hundred persons may vote to establish village). For example, New
Square is a village within the town of Ramapo. Id. at 1391.
See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690–91
(1994).
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Satmars. 32 In 1994, the town had 8,500 residents. 33 Today, the town
has over 24,000, and birth rates are so high that the median resident
is 13.8 years old, about one-third the statewide average. 34
Some Haredim have moved into existing towns. For example, the
Haredi story of Lakewood, New Jersey began in 1943 when Rabbi
Aharon Kotler opened Beth Midrash Gohova (BMG), a yeshiva
specializing in Talmud study. 35 This particular yeshiva became more
popular than most and is today the largest yeshiva in the United
States 36 with 6500 students. 37 As BMG has grown, the town has
become extremely popular among Litvish Haredim, which in turn has
caused explosive growth. 38 The town’s population has grown from
45,000 in 1990 to over 100,000 today. 39 The town is now sixty
percent Jewish, and has more than eighty synagogues and over 100
schools and yeshivas. 40
As towns such as Lakewood and Kiryas Joel have become more
populous, Haredi families have begun to be priced out of those
towns, and to seek housing in nearby suburbs and exurbs. 41 This has
led to a variety of land use-related disputes. For example, in 2014, a
Lakewood developer bought empty land in nearby Toms River,
hoping to build a synagogue; at the time, the land was zoned to allow
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40,
41.

Id. at 691.
Id.
See Kiryas Joel, New York, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/city/KiryasJoel-New-York.html#b [https://perma.cc/WG3F-A2N3] (last visited July 11, 2021).
See Kevin Gilmore, Comment, Ding-Dong Ditched: Cultures Clash as a Town
Attempts to Stop Real Estate Solicitations, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 475, 477 (2018)
(BMG opened in 1943 by Kotler); Jeffrey Olsen, Comment, Making Sense of
Taxpayer Cents: A Look at Lakewood, New Jersey’s Unique School, 19 RUTGERS J.L.
& RELIGION 323, 327 (2018) (all of BMG’s required courses involve study of
Talmud). The Talmud is primarily a commentary on an earlier Jewish code known as
the Mishnah, but also addresses a variety of other issues. See David C. Flatto, The
King and I: The Separation of Powers in Early Hebraic Political Theory, 20 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 61, 67 (2008) (describing how the Talmud was “redacted in the sixth
and seventh centuries . . . [and] presents a running commentary on the Mishnah”). The
Talmud is the primary source of Jewish law. See Adam Mintz, Halakhah in America:
The History of City Eruvin, 1894–1962 (Sept. 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation, New York
University),
http://www.rabbimintz.com/wp-content/uploads/Mintz-DissertationFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7LL-489K] (discussing the development of Jewish law in
the context of ervus from the Mishnah to the Talmud); see infra notes 49–51 and
accompanying text (explaining eruvs).
See Olsen, supra note 35, at 326.
See Gilmore, supra note 35, at 477.
See FADER, supra note 15, at 13.
See Gilmore, supra note 35, at 477.
Id. at 478.
See Olsen, supra note 35, at 326.
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religious uses. 42 The town responded by rezoning the land for
residential use and purchasing the land from the developer. 43 After
another Lakewood developer proposed to build townhomes and retail
space on another parcel of Toms River land, the town purchased that
land as well. 44 Even where government does not preempt
development by Haredim, homeowners try to discourage each other
from selling to Haredim. 45 For example, in the part of Toms River
nearest to Lakewood, front lawns often have signs saying, “Don’t
Sell! Toms River Strong.” 46
Jackson, another town near Lakewood, has also been less than
welcoming towards Jews who seek to leave Lakewood. 47 Under
traditional Jewish law, Jews may not carry objects outside during the
Jewish Sabbath. 48 However, they may do so if they establish an
artificial boundary known as an eruv, 49 which usually requires a
Jewish community to place wires on utility poles to demarcate the
eruv’s boundaries. 50 To build such an eruv, a Jewish community
must usually have municipal permission. 51 Jackson sought to deter
migration from Lakewood by refusing to allow the creation of an
eruv. 52 However, the town reversed its position after a Jewish group
sued. 53
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

51.

52.
53.

Gilmore, supra note 35, at 479.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 481.
Id. at 480.
See Olsen, supra note 35, at 325–26.
Bikur Cholim, Inc. v. Vill. of Suffern, 664 F. Supp. 2d 267, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(Jewish law typically prohibits “carrying objects in public areas[.]”).
See Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 209 (3d Cir. 2004) (An eruv is “a
ceremonial demarcation of an area within which . . . Jews may push or carry objects
on the Sabbath.”).
See Am. C.L. Union of New Jersey v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1294
(D.N.J. 1987). An eruv may also be created from natural barriers. See Smith v. Cmty.
Bd. No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (N.Y. Special Term 1985) (An eruv is “created
from natural barriers or from wires strung across poles[.]”).
See Lorin Geitner, Eruv and Establishment, 52 ORANGE CNTY. L. 26, 27 (2010) (For
an eruv to be effective the “local government must officially recognize this area as an
eruv, and, in return for valuable consideration, lease it to the local Jewish
community.”).
See Olsen, supra note 35, at 324–25.
Austin Bogues, Jackson OKs Eruv Deal for Orthodox Jewish Community, APP.,
https://www.app.com/story/news/local/communitychange/2017/12/13/jackson-towncouncil-approves-eruv-agreement/950352001/ [https://perma.cc/F4SZ-67CE] (Dec.
14, 2017, 2:50 PM).
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Jackson has also banned the construction of new schools and
dormitories in most of the town, which presumably would prevent
the creation of new yeshivas. 54
Residents of Kiryas Joel have also squabbled over land use with
residents of nearby suburbs. In the 2010s, Kiryas Joel proposed to
accommodate population growth by annexing 507 acres of nearby
land. 55 The land in question was in a municipality called the Town of
Monroe, which initially denied permission. 56 However, the town
council approved a more modest request to annex 164 acres. 57 The
county legislature, nine nearby municipalities, and a community
group then sued to prevent both the 507-acre annexation and the
more modest 164-acre annexation proposal. 58 In 2017 the parties
settled litigation over the issue by allowing Kiryas Joel to annex the
164 acres, form its own town, and add 56 more acres. 59 Thus, the
village’s development strategy was only partially successful; it was

54.

55.

56.

57.
58.
59.

See Olsen, supra note 35, at 326. The United States Justice Department has recently
filed suit to invalidate this policy. Patricia Salkin, US DOJ Files Suit Against Jackson,
New Jersey, Alleging Zoning Code Used to Keep Out Orthodox Jewish Schools and
OF
THE
LAND
(May
31,
2020)
Residents,
LAW
https://lawoftheland.wordpress.com/2020/05/31/us-doj-files-suit-against-jacksonnew-jersey-alleging-zoning-code-used-to-keep-out-orthodox-jewish-schools-andresidents/ [https://perma.cc/GMF8-VSMD].
See Cathryn J. Prince, Fierce Protest Against Satmar Annexation of NY Town, THE
TIMES OF ISRAEL (Oct. 8, 2015, 5:18 AM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/fierceprotest-against-satmar-annexation-of-ny-town/
[https://perma.cc/WMB7-2DZL];
Chris McKenna, Kiryas Joel’s Split from Monroe Overwhelmingly Approved, TIMES
HERALD-RECORD, https://www.recordonline.com/news/20171107/kiryas-joels-splitfrom-monroe-overwhelmingly-approved [https://perma.cc/HT26-JXXW] (Nov. 9,
2017, 12:15 AM) (describing Kiryas Joel’s secession from the town of Monroe after a
land dispute involving the 507 acres).
See Prince, supra note 55. As noted above, villages such as Kiryas Joel are generally
part of larger municipalities called towns; for example, Kiryas Joel is part of Monroe.
See Benjamin, supra note 30, at 1395. Villages may annex land from towns, but only
with the town’s permission. See id.
See Prince, supra note 55.
Id.; see Vill. of S. Blooming Grove v. Vill. of Kiryas Joel Bd. of Trustees, No.
51602(U), slip op. at 1–2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 2015) (issuing a preliminary
injunction against annexations pending litigation).
See McKenna, supra note 55. Hasidic attempts to move into other towns near Kiryas
Joel has also led to litigation. See, e.g., Josh Nathan-Kazis, How the Hasids Won the
Battle of Bloomingburg – and Everyone Else Lost, FORWARD (Dec. 15, 2016),
https://forward.com/news/357030/how-the-hasids-won-the-battle-of-bloomingburgand-everyone-else-lost/ [ https://perma.cc/RHU8-FVFY] (describing controversy in
village of Bloomingburg).
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able to annex less than half the land it wanted, and was forced to
spend time litigating the issue. 60
Opposition to new development is of course common in American
suburbs. 61 However, suburbanites are especially motivated to oppose
development in towns near Haredi communities, for two reasons.
First, Haredi communities may have more synagogues, religious
schools, and other tax-exempt institutions than more secular
communities. 62 In Lakewood, for example, 8% of the town’s total
property value is held by such institutions, as opposed to 1.5% in
Toms River. 63 Toms River residents, therefore, fear that
accommodating Haredim will reduce the town’s tax base. 64 Second,
Haredi children mostly attend yeshivas rather than public schools,
and Haredi parents might not be motivated to pay additional taxes to
support those schools. 65 As a result, non-Haredim in both Lakewood
and other Orthodox-dominated suburbs have blamed Haredidominated school boards for allegedly cutting school budgets. 66
Some of the anti-Haredi policies discussed above are likely to
violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) which prohibits discrimination against religious land
uses. 67 For example, the U.S. Justice Department recently sued
Jackson, alleging that Jackson’s restrictions on dormitories violated
RLUIPA. 68 Nevertheless, Haredi communities have an incentive to
avoid conflicts with non-Haredi suburbs, because even successful
litigation is costly, time-consuming, and may lead to avoidable illwill with residents of those communities. 69 Thus, Haredim may wish

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See McKenna, supra note 55.
Cf. Shelley Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism?: Sharing the Benefits and
Burdens of Suburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV. 659, 685–86 (1997)
(suburbanites often refuse to allow unwanted land uses in their community).
See Gilmore, supra note 35, at 482.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 483–84.
E.g., id. at 484–86.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b) (stating that the government must treat religious
institutions on “equal terms” with nonreligious institutions and may not discriminate
against any particular religion).
Salkin, supra note 54 (describing a Justice Department lawsuit against Jackson); cf.
Douglas Laycock & Luke W. Goodrich, RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest and UnderEnforced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1021, 1027 (2012) (describing similar cases).
For example, Kiryas Joel first sought to annex land in 2015, and did not settle its
dispute with nearby municipalities until 2017. See Prince, supra note 55; McKenna,
supra note 55.
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to stay within the city limits of towns that they already inhabit in
order to avoid such conflicts.
II. SMART GROWTH AND WHY IT IS RELEVANT
Haredim who move outside the city limits of towns like Lakewood
are often moving into suburban sprawl; that is, low-density
development at the fringe of a city or a metro area, 70 as opposed to
development near older areas such as downtown Lakewood. 71 Such
development is usually oriented towards automobiles rather than to

70.

71.

See Ronda Larson, Note & Comment, The End of an Era: Suburban Village Aversion
in Citizens for Mount Vernon v. City of Mount Vernon, 74 WASH. L. REV. 367, 376
n.52 (1999) (“Researchers have defined suburban sprawl, also called urban sprawl, as
low density, homogeneous, single-family residential districts sited at urban fringe of
metropolitan areas.”).
Lakewood, NJ, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps [https://perma.cc/
73YW-VQK6] (last visited July 11, 2021). Toms River does have a downtown;
however, most Haredi-related conflicts over development seem to be areas bordering
Lakewood at the fringe of the town, several miles from downtown Lakewood. See
Gilmore, supra note 35, at 492 (referring to land use-related conflicts near the
Lakewood/Toms
River
border);
Toms
River,
NJ,
GOOGLE MAPS,
https://www.google.com/maps [https://perma.cc/73YW-VQK6] (last visited July 11,
2021) (mapping the Toms River/Lakewood border at the northern edge of Toms River
several miles from downtown Lakewood, while City Hall and the courthouse are at
the southern end of Toms River). Jackson does not appear to have anything
resembling a traditional downtown. Jackson Township, NJ, GOOGLE MAPS,
https://www.google.com/maps [https://perma.cc/73YW-VQK6] (last visited July 11,
2021) (mapping City Hall at 95 W. Veterans Highway, a suburban environment, with
no sidewalks and buildings set back far behind street).
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public transit or walkers. 72 This is also true of most of Lakewood
outside of downtown. 73
Because so much new development is miles from downtown
Lakewood, downtown is less prosperous than urban Haredi
neighborhoods, such as Borough Park and Williamsburg in
Brooklyn 74—despite the fact that downtown is less than a mile from
the enormous Beth Midrash Godova (BMG) yeshiva. 75 One might
think that because of the size of BMG, the blocks near BMG could
function as a dense satellite downtown, full of large apartment
buildings and stores that serve students. Instead, those blocks
continue to be dominated by single-family houses. 76 By contrast, if

72.

See In re Petition of Dolington Land Group, 839 A.2d 1021, 1028 n.8 (Pa. 2003)
(describing sprawl as typically “automobile dependent”); M. Tanner Claggett, If It’s
Not Mixed-Income, It Won't Be Transit-Oriented: Ensuring Our Future Developments
are Equitable and Promote Transit, 41 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 9 n.61 (2014) (referring to the
“mid-20th century exodus to automobile-dependent suburbs”); MICHAEL LEWYN,
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND SUBURBAN SPRAWL: THE CASE FOR MARKET
URBANISM 101 (2017).
[I]n such thinly populated places, very few people can walk to
shops or other destinations. For example, suppose that a grocery
store is in a neighborhood with only five homes or apartments per
block. If most people will walk no more than five blocks to the
store, that means that only twenty-five households in any
direction will walk to the store. By contrast, if the same store is
surrounded by 30 dwellings per block, 150 households in each
direction can walk to the store.

73.
74.

75.

76.

Id.
See infra note 152 and accompanying text (noting Lakewood’s low density).
See Nick DiUlio, Lakewood: A City on Edge, N.J. MONTHLY (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://njmonthly.com/articles/politics-public-affairs/lakewood-city-on-edge/3/
[https://perma.cc/B76V-QC62] (“Walking along Clifton Avenue through Lakewood’s
once-flourishing downtown, one sees few signs of a boom. The presence of several
upscale restaurants and a smattering of other contemporary businesses—like the
French Press, a coffee bar—is offset by other storefronts that are dirty and
neglected.”); see also Shefler, supra note 27 (describing the population boom in
Brooklyn’s Haredi neighborhoods).
See Lakewood, NJ, GOOGLE MAPS, supra note 71 (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then
search starting point field for “Beth Medrash Govoha” and search destination field for
“Lakewood Municipal Office”; then click walking icon) (showing that BMG is a 0.6
mile walk from City Hall); supra notes 35–38 and accompanying text (describing
BMG).
See Lakewood, NJ, GOOGLE MAPS, supra note 71 (showing that 625 7th Street, across
street from BMG, is still dominated by single-family homes).
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there was more dense housing near BMG and downtown, more
people would be able to walk to those destinations. 77
A. The Costs of Sprawl
Lakewood’s pattern of sprawl development may have some
benefits. In low-density sprawl, many people meet their needs by
driving to strip malls with huge free parking lots, instead of paying
for parking in a downtown garage. 78 However, this pattern of
development also has costs.
One cost unique to Haredi towns is political. As Haredim move
further away from existing Haredi neighborhoods, they will have to
move to areas already dominated by non-Haredim. 79 Often, as in
Jackson and Toms River, these neighbors may not welcome Haredim
with open arms, and will instead use legislation and litigation to
prevent the construction of Haredi-oriented synagogues, private
schools, and other religious infrastructure. 80 By contrast, if Haredim
build more housing in existing Haredi towns such as Lakewood, they
will waste less time and money on lobbying and litigation. 81
Even where sprawl is not politically controversial, it may have
adverse fiscal and environmental consequences. Towns such as
Lakewood and Kiryas Joel are not wealthy areas; 45.1% of Kiryas
Joel residents and 29.6% of Lakewood residents have incomes below
the poverty level. 82 Where commercial development is scattered
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.

82.

See LEWYN, supra note 72, at 101.
See id. (describing when people must walk versus drive to shops). My sense, based on
conversations with Lakewood residents, was that the strip malls far from downtown
seemed to have more parking than downtown. See Lakewood, NJ, GOOGLE MAPS,
supra note 71 (strip mall at 945 River Avenue with many unused parking spaces).
See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing the migration of Haredi families
to suburbs and exurbs from Haredi areas).
See, e.g., supra notes 42–60 and accompanying text (describing land use conflicts in
towns near Lakewood).
One other point that may be especially relevant to Orthodox Jews is that because they
cannot ride on the Sabbath, they must live within walking distance of a synagogue.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Thus, they must live in at least somewhat
compact communities. However, Haredim are so resourceful at establishing small
congregations that hundreds exist in Lakewood. See Lakewood, NJ, GODAVEN:
MINYANIM EVERYWHERE, https://www.godaven.com/ [https://perma.cc/S8J2-36MK]
(last visited July 11, 2021) (showing that 149 congregations are open on the Sabbath
within five miles of Lakewood).
See Kiryas Joel, New York, CITY-DATA.COM, supra note 34; Lakewood, New Jersey,
CITY-DATA.COM,
http://www.city-data.com/city/Lakewood-New-Jersey.html
[https://perma.cc/A9NC-U2ZP] (last visited July 11, 2021). One might think that the
city’s high poverty rate is instead the result of racial diversity or high levels of
immigration. But in Lakewood, unlike much of the United States, the poverty level
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widely across the landscape, people may need to own a car to access
shops and jobs in other neighborhoods 83—a significant hardship for
households without cars (a category that includes over forty percent
of Kiryas Joel households). 84
In addition to increasing household vehicle expenses, sprawl
increases costs for school commutes because, in a sprawling region,
fewer children can walk to school and students therefore must be
driven or bused longer distances than in a more compact region. In
New Jersey and in some New York towns, school districts subsidize
buses for private schools. 85 Because many Lakewood children cannot
walk to school, that district spends $27 million yearly on busing—
more than it spends on instruction. 86 Government supports private
school busing even for children who live in one town and go to
school in another; 87 as a result, Toms River has to pay to bus its
Orthodox children who go to school in Lakewood. 88 While Toms
River paid to bus 150 students five years ago, it now pays to bus

83.

84.

85.

86.
87.
88.

among whites is higher than the poverty level among blacks or Hispanics—a fact
suggesting that yeshiva students are especially likely to have poverty-level incomes.
See Lakewood, New Jersey, CITY-DATA, supra. On the other hand, some of these
students might be supported by in-laws or parents. See id. (reporting that the median
age in Lakewood is 16.7, whereas the median age in New Jersey is 40.2).
This is less true in big cities with significant public transit systems. However, both
Lakewood and Kiryas Joel are over 50 miles from New York City, and thus unlikely
to have significant public transit in the foreseeable future. See Lakewood, NJ, GOOGLE
MAPS, supra note 71; Kiryas Joel, NY, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps
[https://perma.cc/73YW-VQK6] (last visited July 11, 2021).
See Household Size by Vehicles Available, Kiryas Joel Village, New York, tbl.B08201,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=B08201
&g=1600000US3639853&tid=ACSDT5Y2019.B08201
[https://perma.cc/H29S5DDQ].
THE
MASTERS
SCH.,
See
Daily
Transportation
to
Masters,
https://www.mastersny.org/admission/transportation [https://perma.cc/9ZVG-FF5M]
(last visited July 2, 2021) (“Most New York towns and villages . . . [near school] that
provide busing to public school students will provide busing to [private school]
students as well.”); Kelly Heyboer, Why is Lakewood Spending $32M to Send Kids to
Private School?, NJ.COM, https://www.nj.com/news/2017/08/why_is_lakewood_
spending_32_million_to_send_kids_t.html [https://perma.cc/W444-KH33] (May 15,
2019, 1:04 PM) (showing public support for private school busing in New Jersey).
Heyboer, supra note 85.
Id.
See Adam Clark, Lakewood’s School Busing Mess Spilled over to Its Neighbor.
Here’s the Price Tag, NJ.COM, https://www.nj.com/education/2019/05/lakewoodsschool-busing-mess-spilled-over-to-its-neighbor-heres-the-price-tag.html
[https://perma.cc/98KH-892B] (May 23, 2019, 12:30 PM).

50

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

1,100 students, contributing to a $1.1 million busing bill.89 By
contrast, if Haredim lived in more compact communities, more
students would live within walking distance of their yeshivas, thus
reducing taxpayers’ transportation costs.
Furthermore, automobile-oriented sprawl creates environmental
harms from constant vehicle travel. 90 Numerous studies have found
that high levels of automobile traffic contribute to localized air
pollution, which in turn increases heart disease, asthma, and similar
problems. 91 For example, one study showed that children are more
likely to suffer from asthma and bronchitis if they live near busy
roads with high levels of pollution caused by vehicle traffic. 92 This
correlation is not limited to the most polluted cities but applies even
to areas with low levels of overall pollution. 93 Because automobileoriented sprawl causes more people to drive more miles, it is likely to
increase pollution and the resulting health risks.
89.
90.

91.
92.

93.

Id.
E.g., Christine L. Rioux et al., Characterizing Urban Traffic Exposures Using
Transportation Planning Tools: An Illustrated Methodology for Health Researchers,
87 J. URB. HEALTH 167, 168 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC2845826/pdf/11524_2009_Article_9419.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM8Q-WMM2].
Id. at 167–68.
See Janice J. Kim et al., Traffic-Related Air Pollution near Busy Roads: The East Bay
Children's Respiratory Health Study, 170 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE
MED. 520, 523–24 (2004), https://www.atsjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1164/rccm.200403281OC [https://perma.cc/V858-WVCE] (finding “modest but significant increases in
the odds of bronchitis symptoms and physician-diagnosed asthma in neighborhoods
with higher concentrations of traffic pollutants” and adding that variations in exposure
were “due specifically to roads with heavy traffic”).
Id. at 523 (“[O]ur findings were observed in a region with relatively clean air . . . .”).
It could be argued that sprawl creates environmental benefits that outweigh its costs,
because as people move to low-density environments, they have fewer neighbors and
thus fewer pollution-causing vehicles near them. See Michael Lewyn, The
Environmentalist Case for Sprawl—And Why It Fails, 46 REAL EST. L.J. 92, 101
(2017) (citing Wendell Cox, Reducing Greenhouse Gases from Personal Mobility:
Opportunities and Possibilities, REASON FOUND., Nov. 2011, at 1, 10,
https://reason.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/reducing_greenhouse_gases_mobility_development.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V858-WVCE]). This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons.
First, traffic is caused not just by neighbors, but by visitors from other neighborhoods.
Id. at 101–02. So, in an automobile-dependent town where people are driving into a
wide variety of neighborhoods, they are creating pollution in all types of
neighborhoods. Id. (giving the example of downtown that suffers high levels of
pollution from suburban commuters). Second, dense urban areas can have low traffic
volumes as long as they are not near major roads such as interstate highways. See,
e.g., Rioux et al., supra note 90, at 175–83 (showing an example from Boston, where
streets near interstate highways have far more auto traffic than places just a few
blocks away); Lewyn, supra, at 102–03 (citing other examples).
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Such development has other public health costs as well. Where
people must drive to every conceivable destination, they do not get as
much exercise during their daily lives. 94 If people get less exercise,
they may suffer more from obesity and related health problems. 95 For
example, one study by three Arizona State University scholars
created a “walkability index” (measuring the distance of places of
worship, schools and entertainment from an address) and found that
areas with high walkability scores were less likely to have high levels
of obesity, diabetes, hypertension, and heart disease. 96
Generally, cities and regions with high levels of automobile
commuting tend to have higher death rates from car crashes. 97 For
example, New York City (where most people use public transit to get
to work) 98 has far lower vehicle death rates than its car-dependent
suburbs. 99 Manhattan, the Bronx, suburban Nassau County, and
suburban Suffolk County all have roughly equal populations
(between 1.3 and 1.7 million residents). 100 Yet between 2012 and
94.

E.g., Maggie L. Grabow et al., Air Quality and Exercise-Related Health Benefits from
Reduced Car Travel in the Midwestern United States, 120 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 68,
68 (2012), https://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/doi/pdf/10.1289/ehp.1103440 [https://perma.cc/
6UL7-T8LM].
95. Id.
96. See Vasudha Lathey et al., The Impact of Subregional Variations in Urban Sprawl on
the Prevalence of Obesity and Related Morbidity, 29 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH. 127,
132–34
(2009),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0739456X09348615
[https://perma.cc/NB2E-CYUR]; see also LEWYN, supra note 72, at 15 n.67 (citing
other studies with similar results).
97. LEWYN, supra note 72, at 16–19 (citing various examples; for example, five
metropolitan areas with lowest percentages of commuters driving to work had
between 5 and 6 car crash deaths per 100,000 residents in 2009, while of five
metropolitan areas with highest levels of car commuting, four had between 9 and 11
deaths per 100,000 and the fifth had 7.5).
98. See Commuting Characteristics by Sex, New York City, New York, tbl.S0801, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
(2019),
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=S0801
&tid=ACSST1Y2019.S0801 [https://perma.cc/6SQZ-9EW3]. Under 8% of
Manhattan residents and 26% of Bronx residents drive or carpool to work. Id. at New
York County, New York, tbl.S0801; id. at Bronx County, New York, tbl.S0801.
99. See Robert Wood Johnson Found. & Univ. Wis. Population Health Inst., New York
Summary Information: Motor Vehicle Crash Deaths, CNTY HEALTH RANKINGS &
ROADMAPS
(2020),
https://www.countyhealthrankings.org/app/new-york/2020/
measure/factors/39/data [https://perma.cc/S7HE-H64J] (last visited July 22, 2021). In
contrast to New York City, 74.6% of Nassau County residents and 87% of Suffolk
County residents drive or carpool to work. See Commuting Characteristics by Sex,
supra note 98, at Nassau County, New York; id. at Suffolk County, New York.
100. See Population of Counties in New York, WORLD POPULATION REV. (2021),
https://worldpopulationreview.com/us-counties/states/ny
[https://perma.cc/H5LSN38H] (last visited July 10, 2021).
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2018, Manhattan and the Bronx had 300 and 378 traffic deaths
respectively, while Nassau and Suffolk Counties had 576 and 982
traffic deaths, respectively. 101
If (as in Lakewood and its neighbors) suburban development skips
over municipal boundaries, 102 it may threaten the financial viability
of older municipalities such as Lakewood. If households that choose
Toms River or Jackson over Lakewood are wealthier than those who
stay in Lakewood, Lakewood (like many larger cities) will have a
smaller residential tax base than its neighbors, 103 causing it to suffer
from higher taxes and worse public services. As commercial
development sprawls beyond Lakewood’s town limits, Lakewood’s
commercial tax base may deteriorate. In turn, a weak central city may
make the entire region less attractive, as people who like urban living
shun areas with undesirable central cities. 104
B. Smart Growth Benefits (and Possible Costs)
The leading alternative to sprawl is commonly referred to as “smart
growth.” 105 Although this term is somewhat imprecise, some
commentators have defined it to include shifting growth towards
existing neighborhoods (as opposed to the fringe of a city or metro
area) and development that makes cities more walkable, as opposed
to development solely oriented towards automobiles. 106 In the context
of a small city like Lakewood or Kiryas Joel, that means adding
101. See Robert Wood Johnson Found. & Univ. Wis. Population Health Inst., supra note
99.
102. See supra notes 35–45 and accompanying text (describing Haredi-oriented
development in towns near Lakewood).
103. Cf. Roy Bahl et al., Central City-Suburban Fiscal Disparities, 20 PUB. FIN. REV. 420,
425 (1992) (noting taxes per capita are 1.25 times higher in central cities than in
suburbs).
104. See Andrew F. Haughwout & Robert P. Inman, Should Suburbs Help Their Central
City?, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFFAIRS 45, 46–47 (2002).
105. See Oliver A. Pollard III, Smart Growth and Sustainable Transportation: Can We Get
There From Here?, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1529, 1530 n.7 (2002) (noting smart
growth is “the leading alternative to sprawl”); Timothy Beatley & Richard Collins,
Smart Growth and Beyond: Transitioning to a Sustainable Society, 19 VA. ENV’T L.J.
287, 289 (2000) (“[S]mart growth is generally defined in relation to sprawl, as the
alternative or antidote to sprawl.”).
106. See Pollard, supra note 105, at 1530 (“[Smart growth] include[s] efforts to develop a
more balanced transportation system; revitalize existing communities . . . and promote
development that offers a variety of land uses in close proximity and that can support
public transit, bicycling, and walking.”); Beatley & Collins, supra note 105, at 289
(noting smart growth initiatives “general[ly] . . . aim to guide new growth into
somewhat denser, more compact areas, where existing public services and facilities
are already located”).
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development to existing downtowns and neighborhoods near those
downtowns, rather than spreading out into nearby towns and suburbs.
If a smart growth vision was implemented, more people would live
downtown, and more cities would look like Israel’s Haredi towns
(which tend to be far more compact and walkable than their U.S.
equivalents). 107 To the extent that American communities resembled
these Israeli towns, their residents would benefit in a variety of wayssome especially relevant to Haredim, and others that apply equally to
all Americans.
1.

Haredi-Specific Benefits

One benefit of smart growth disproportionately affects Haredim.
As noted above, one disadvantage of sprawl is that where Haredim
are scattered across several suburbs or towns, land use conflicts are
more common, because each new town that Haredim move into is
another town where they have to lobby and litigate for permission to
build homes, synagogues, and schools. 108 By contrast, if Haredim
were concentrated in a smaller number of towns, they would
dominate those towns, which means that Haredi-oriented
development would be more popular, 109 and that developers would
spend less money and time on lobbying and litigation. Thus, smart
growth facilitates the construction of housing and shops for Haredim.

107. See infra notes 113–16 (describing Israeli towns). Seventy-seven percent of Israeli
Haredi households own no car. THE ISR. DEMOCRACY INST., STATISTICAL REPORT ON
ULTRA-ORTHODOX SOCIETY IN ISRAEL 16 (2016), https://en.idi.org.il/media/4240/
shnaton-e_8-9-16_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/6FYE-B2UY]. This percentage is far
higher than the poverty rate among Israel Haredim. Id. (finding a poverty rate of fiftytwo percent for Israel Haredim). Thus, it appears that low rates of car ownership there
are caused not just by poverty, but by Haredi willingness to live in walkable
neighborhoods where cars are unnecessary. Id.
108. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text (describing conflicts).
109. In fact, Lakewood has allowed more new housing in recent years than its neighbors.
Twelve percent of Lakewood housing was built after 2010, as opposed to less than
two percent of Toms River housing. See Comparative Housing Characteristics, New
York
City,
New
York,
tbl.CP04,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019),
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?q=CP04%20New%20York,%20New%20York&t
id=ACSCP5Y2019.CP04&hidePreview=true
[https://perma.cc/6FYE-B2UY];
Selected Housing Characteristics, New York City, New York, tbl.DP04, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU
(2019),
https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table
?q=DP04%20New%20York,%20New%20York&tid=ACSDP5Y2019.DP04&hidePre
view=true [https://perma.cc/579G-KU5D]. This fact strongly suggests that Haredidominated Lakewood is more permissive than Toms River.
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And as noted above, sprawl maximizes both household expenses
for car use and municipal expenses for school busing; 110 when most
people must drive from town to town to meet their daily needs, they
have to purchase more cars and drive them more miles, and their
government has to spend more money busing children who live far
from school. It logically follows that less sprawling development
reduces car and school bus expenses, and thus is more economical for
both the private and public sectors. This benefit of smart growth is
especially relevant to Haredim, for two reasons. First, Haredi towns
tend to be poorer than most—which means that they have less money
for vehicles. 111 Lakewood’s median household income is less than
two-thirds of the New Jersey average, and Kiryas Joel is even poorer
than Lakewood. 112 Second, Haredim have large families, 113 which
means that if no children walk to school, their school bus
expenditures will be larger than those of other towns.
2.

Other Benefits

The smart growth benefits discussed above are especially relevant
to Haredi communities such as Lakewood and Kiryas Joel. Other
benefits do not disproportionately benefit these communities, but
create positive effects everywhere. Where long-distance driving is
not mandatory, there will be less car-induced air pollution.114
Although such pollution may be less common in smaller towns with
fewer commuters, it is nevertheless the case that even in the suburbs,
some roads may be busy enough to create dangerous levels of
pollution.115 Similarly, car crashes and illnesses related to lack of
110. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
111. Adi Gold, Haredi Town is Poorest Place in US, YNETNEWS (Apr. 26, 2011, 7:48
AM),
https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4060398,00.html
[https://perma.cc/W97L-6D7M].
112. See Lakewood, New Jersey, CITY-DATA.COM, supra note 82 (demonstrating that the
median income for Lakewood is just over $47,000, while statewide median income is
over $80,000); Kiryas Joel, New York, CITY-DATA.COM, supra note 34 (illustrating
Kiryas Joel’s median income as just over $32,000 and roughly half of the statewide
median).
113. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
114. See Anushree Gupta, Driving for Long Hours? Here is How it is Impacting Your
Health, TIMESNOWNEWS, https://www.timesnownews.com/health/article/driving-forlong-hours-here-is-how-it-is-impacting-your-health/435411 [https://perma.cc/F2LB67D6] (Jun. 12, 2019, 1:20 PM).
115. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text (discussing a study of San Francisco
suburbs); Shao Lin et. al., Childhood Asthma Hospitalization and Residential
Exposure to State Route Traffic, 88 ENV’T RSCH. 73, 76–77 (2002),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0013935101943038
[https://perma.cc/9JNM-QSUL] (noting similar results in Buffalo suburbs).
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exercise exist in every kind of community, and can be reduced
through smart growth if people drive less and walk more. 116 And if
affluent households stay in existing towns rather than moving to
newer suburbs, the existing towns will be wealthier. 117
3.

COVID-19: A Cost of Smart Growth?

It could be argued that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, sprawl
is less dangerous than any alternative, because low population
density and high automobile use facilitates social distancing. 118 At
first glance, this argument may seem persuasive, because dense,
transit-dependent New York has suffered more from COVID-19 than
more automobile-oriented cities such as Los Angeles. 119 But this
argument overlooks a few important facts.
First of all, although the New York region has suffered more than
other regions, the most compact parts of the New York region were
not the most heavily infected. 120 Manhattan is the densest borough,121
yet peak infection rates were higher in the city’s suburbs and outer
boroughs. 122 As of early August 2020, Manhattan had 1,900 COVID19 cases per 100,000 people—less than half the rate of suburban
Rockland County (which had over 4,000 cases per 100,000 people),
116. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Joel Kotkin, Opinion, Angelenos Like Their Single-Family Sprawl. The
Coronavirus Proves Them Right, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-04-26/coronavirus-cities-density-losangeles-transit [https://perma.cc/ADF6-MZFR]. But cf. James Brasuell, Density
Debate Rages Alongside the Pandemic, PLANETIZEN (Apr. 27, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.planetizen.com/blogs/109173-density-debate-rages-alongside-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/XSM4-4YF9] (citing articles on all sides of issue).
119. See Kotkin, supra note 118.
120. Matt Coneybeare, New York City Population Density Mapped, VIEWING NYC (Dec. 5,
2014, 10:34 AM), https://viewing.nyc/new-york-city-population-density-mapped/
[https://perma.cc/A82E-7796].
121. See NYU FURMAN CENTER, STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND
NEIGHBORHOODS
IN
2018
37,
51,
71,
85,
101
(2018),
https://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/2018_SOC_Full_2018-07-31.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HL3A-DAZ4] (listing density of each borough).
122. See Todd Litman, Lessons from Pandemics: Transportation Risks and Safety
Strategies,
PLANETIZEN
(Apr.
23,
2020,
5:00
AM),
https://www.planetizen.com/blogs/109146-lessons-pandemics-transportation-risksand-safety-strategies [https://perma.cc/GB87-4LHH]; Density and COVID-19 in New
York City, CITIZENS HOUS. PLAN. COUNCIL N.Y.C. (May 2020),
https://chpcny.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CHPC-Density-COVID19-inNYC.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ5L-QR7A].
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fewer than any of the four outer boroughs, and also fewer than
suburban Bergen, Passaic, Hudson, Orange, Nassau, and Suffolk
Counties. 123 Within Manhattan, the three least heavily infected zip
codes have above-average levels of population density. 124 Thus, it
appears that within the New York region, there is no correlation
between population density and COVID-19 infections.
Second, other dense cities have been far more successful in
controlling this disease than New York. San Francisco is the second
densest big city (with just over 17,000 persons per square mile) in the
United States. 125 But as of early August 2020, San Francisco had 784
cases per 100,000 residents. 126 Obviously, this number is far lower
than that of New York and its suburbs—but San Francisco also has
fewer than half as many infections per person as Los Angeles
County, 127 despite the fact that the latter county has less than one-

123. See At Least 159,000 People Have Died From Coronavirus in the U.S., WASH. POST,
(Aug.
10,
2020,
8:15
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/coronavirus-us-casesdeaths/ [https://perma.cc/5UGM-AEY3]. All of the outer-borough and suburban
counties had between 2,239 (Bergen) and 3,739 (Westchester) cases per 100,000
residents. Id.
124. As of August 10, 2021, the New York City zip codes with the lowest infection rates
were in Manhattan—10280 (644 cases per 100,000), 10007 (848), 10012 (846). See
COVID-19: Data, NYCHEALTH, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/covid/covid-19-datatotals.page [https://perma.cc/4CWH-JUBH] (last visited Nov. 8, 2021). Each of these
three zip codes have over 40,000 people per square mile—about fifty percent more
than the citywide density level. See New York Population Density Zip Code Rank,
USA,
http://www.usa.com/rank/new-york-state--population-density--zip-coderank.htm [https://perma.cc/PD5B-EKCR] (last visited July 12, 2021) (listing densities
of each zip code); Mike Macaig, Mapping the Nation’s Most Densely Populated
Cities, GOVERNING (Oct. 2, 2013), https://www.governing.com/archive/most-denselypopulated-cities-data-map.html [https://perma.cc/FD3T-NXVW] (highlighting New
York City has 27,012 people per square mile).
125. See COVID-19: Data, supra note 124; New York Population Density Zip Code Rank,
supra note 124; Macaig, supra note 124.
126. See At Least 159,000 People Have Died From Coronavirus in the U.S., supra note
123. Although the Post COVID-19 tracker generally lists deaths by county rather than
city, this classification is irrelevant to San Francisco, because the city of San
Francisco and its county are identical. See City and County of San Francisco, SF.GOV,
https://sf.gov [https://perma.cc/4YSR-VK47] (last visited July 14, 2021) (showing
that San Francisco City and County are one entity).
127. See At Least 159,000 People Have Died From Coronavirus in the U.S., supra note
123 (stating that San Francisco has 784 infections per 100,00 residents while Los
Angeles County has just over 2,000 infections: more than twice that of San
Francisco).

2021]

Bringing Judaism Downtown

57

sixth the density of San Francisco. 128 A recent study published in the
Journal of the American Planning Association finds that even though
large metropolitan areas such as New York tend to have higher
infection rates, “after controlling for metropolitan population, county
density is unrelated to the infection rate and negatively related to the
mortality rate.” 129 Similarly, during the 1918 influenza pandemic,
lower-density areas actually suffered higher mortality rates. 130
Third, Lakewood is unlikely to ever reach New York, or even San
Francisco, levels of density. As of 2018, Lakewood had 102,000
residents within its twenty-five square miles. 131 To reach San
Francisco’s level of density, Lakewood would need 425,000 people,
more than four times its current size. 132
4.

Is There Demand for Smart Growth?

It could also be argued that even if zoning rules allowed more
dense housing near downtown, the market would prefer suburbs with
more land because Haredim have large families and thus need more
space than other households.
This argument is unpersuasive for three reasons. First, Haredi
families are perfectly capable of living in dense neighborhoods; for
example, Borough Park and Williamsburg both have over 60,000
people per square mile, 133 far above New York’s citywide average. 134
128. Los Angeles County has 2,472 persons per square mile. See Los Angeles County,
California (CA), CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-data.com/county/Los_Angeles_
County-CA.html [https://perma.cc/36SG-YY44] (last visited July 13, 2021).
129. See Shima Hamidi et al., Does Density Aggravate the COVID-19 Pandemic?, 86 J.
AM. PLAN. ASS’N 495, 495 (2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/
10.1080/01944363.2020.1777891?fbclid=IwAR1TiLlh4VKpSLVJTNS6tOctjFd6A9r
aU6zrTCdNWDw-_sKpbqRxr0ZXzPg [https://perma.cc/J8C7-FFYS].
130. See id.
131. See David P. Willis & Stacey Barchenger, Lakewood 2030: This is the Future of the
Fastest-Growing NJ Township, APP., https://www.app.com/story/news/investigations/
watchdog/investigations/2019/04/15/lakewood-nj-growth-business-office/
2701306002/ [https://perma.cc/3267-JH2U] (Dec. 30, 2019, 9:40 AM).
132. Compare Macaig, supra note 124 (stating that San Francisco has a population of
17,179.2 per square mile), with Willis & Barchenger, supra note 131 (explaining that
Lakewood has 102,000 residents per 25 square miles).
133. See Borough Park Neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York (NY), 11204, 11218, 11219,
http://www.city11220
Detailed
Profile,
CITY-DATA.COM,
data.com/neighborhood/Borough-Park-Brooklyn-NY.html
[https://perma.cc/24JT22CX] (last visited July 14, 2021); Williamsburg–South Side Neighborhood in
Brooklyn, New York (NY), 11206, 11211 Detailed Profile, CITY-DATA.COM,
http://www.city-data.com/neighborhood/Williamsburg---South-Side-BrooklynNY.html [https://perma.cc/D9T7-WCJ3] (last visited July 14, 2021); see discussion
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Similarly, Israel has high-density Haredi settlements. 135 Modi’in Illit,
one of these Haredi cities, 136 has just over 47,000 people per square
mile. 137 Because Modi’in Illit is so compact, most of its residents do
not own cars. 138 Another Haredi city, Bnei Brak, 139 is even more
dense than Borough Park or Williamsburg. 140
Second, even if larger households want large houses, Haredi towns
have a significant number of smaller households. A quarter of all
Lakewood households have two or fewer occupants, 141 as do about

134.
135.

136.

137.

138.
139.

140.

141.

supra note 26 and accompanying text (stating Borough Park and Williamsburg are
among New York’s leading Haredi neighborhoods). It could be argued that residents
of Lakewood or other suburban neighborhoods prefer less density than residents of
Borough Park. On the other hand, as long as Lakewood is less expensive than city
neighborhoods, people who want more land can still purchase it there.
See Macaig, supra note 124 (stating New York City has just over 27,000 people per
square mile).
See Stuart Winer, Haredi Population Growing Twice as Fast as Overall Israeli
Population – Report, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Dec. 31, 2020, 5:34 PM),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/haredi-population-growing-twice-as-fast-as-totalisraeli-population-report/ [https://perma.cc/8AUV-RML7] (stating that the Haredi
population in Israel numbers around 1.175 million, showing an annual growth rate of
4.2% over the past decade).
See, e.g., Modi’in Illit (Kiryat Sefer), NEFSH B’NEFESH, https://www.nbn.org.il/
aliyahpedia/community-housing-aliyahpedia/community-profiles/modiin-elite-kiryatsefer/ [https://perma.cc/4J59-9AKH] (last visited July 14, 2021) (describing city as
“Litvish-oriented”).
See Israel, CITY POPULATION, https://www.citypopulation.de/en/israel/cities/
[https://perma.cc/AB47-HPA4] (last visited July 13, 2021) (stating Modi’in Illit has
73,000 people in 4 square kilometers, or just over 1.5 square miles); THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2020 357 (Sarah Janssen, ed.) (2019) (explaining that
a square kilometer is 0.386 square miles).
See Modi’in Illit (Kiryat Sefer), supra note 136 (stating most residents of Modi’in Illit
do not own cars).
See Israel Kasnett, Israel’s Haredi Population: Is it Growing or Shrinking?, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL (June 5, 2018, 10:27 AM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/floridajewish-journal/fl-jjps-haredi-0613-20180605-story.html
[https://perma.cc/7AHGDL85] (discussing birthrates in Bnei Brak and Modi’in Illit in context of an article
about Haredi birthrates, thus implicitly suggesting that these are Israel’s leading
Haredi towns).
Bnei Brak has just over 198,000 people in 7.4 square kilometers, or just over 2.8
square miles. See Israel, supra note 137 (outlining the data for town); THE WORLD
ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, supra note 137, at 357. Thus, Bnei Brak has about
79,000 people per square mile. See Convert Km to Miles, UNITCONVERTERS,
https://www.unitconverters.net/length/km-to-miles.htm
[https://perma.cc/T4D5RU73] (last visited July 14, 2021) (stating that the conversion rate between kilometers
and miles is .62 miles per 1 km).
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 84 (stating Lakewood has 10,298 housing units;
1,119 have one person and 1,669 have two).
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fifteen percent of Kiryas Joel households. 142 Third, even larger
households might be willing to pay for less land than zoning codes
typically require—for example, a condominium with multiple
bedrooms instead of a single-family house, or a detached house on a
smaller lot than current zoning might require. 143 So, even if the
largest households need amounts of space typically associated with
suburbia, they might not need to consume the amount of land
typically required by zoning codes.
III. HOW TO GET THERE: A SMART GROWTH AGENDA
As explained above, Haredim can minimize land use conflicts with
neighboring municipalities if more housing is built in existing
Haredi-dominated towns. 144 Under a smart growth policy, mid- and
high-rise apartments might ring downtown, and smaller houses and
apartment buildings could be scattered through quieter
neighborhoods. 145
The high growth rate of Haredi towns suggests that zoning is not
extremely restrictive by national standards, 146 but they still have
many sprawl-producing restrictions, such as (A) density regulation,
(B) single-use zoning, (C) setback rules, and (D) minimum parking
requirements. 147 Each of these will be addressed in turn. Because
Lakewood is larger and less densely populated than other Haredi
communities such as Kiryas Joel, 148 this Article focuses particularly
on Lakewood as a case study. However, many of the zoning
regulations common in Lakewood are common in other
municipalities as well; thus, the analysis below could be relevant to
most suburbs and small towns.
142. See id. (finding out of 4,169 housing units, 108 have one occupant and 578 have two).
143. See infra Section III.A. (describing density limits in Lakewood). Cf. Michael Lewyn,
Explaining Market Urbanism, 46 REAL EST. L.J. 589, 591 n.14 (2018) (stating typical
zoning codes require houses to consume one quarter of an acre of land).
144. See supra notes 55–69, 79–81 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
146. See Willis & Barchenger, supra note 131 (stating that Lakewood fastest-growing
municipality in New Jersey); Kiryas Joel, New York, CITY-DATA.COM, supra note 34
(explaining that Kiryas Joel grew by 83.9% since 2000).
147. See infra Sections III.A.–D.
148. Lakewood is only one-fifth as dense as Kiryas Joel. See supra notes 133–34 and
accompanying text (showing that Lakewood has just over 4,000 people per square
mile); Kiryas Joel, New York, CITY-DATA.COM, supra note 34 (showing that Kiryas
Joel has just under 22,000 people per square mile); supra notes 141–42 and
accompanying text (showing that Lakewood has twice as many households as Kiryas
Joel).
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A. Density Regulation
Zoning codes generally limit housing supply by limiting the
number of housing units per acre, or by requiring each house to
occupy X number of square feet; 149 Lakewood is no exception.
Lakewood has a wide variety of residential zoning districts, each
with its own housing supply caps. For example, in the town’s R-40
zoning district, each house must consume 40,000 square feet, equal
to almost one full acre of land, 150 or one-fifth the size of a New York
City block. 151 Only a few small portions of the city are zoned R-40;
however, other low-density zones are common on the town’s
outskirts, 152 including R-20 (requiring 20,000 square feet of land per
house), R-15 (15,000 square feet per house), and R-12 (12,000 square
feet per house). 153
Because downtowns tend to be more dense than other areas, 154 one
might argue that low-density zoning makes sense at the edge of town.
But this argument does not justify lower densities near downtowns;
instead, downtowns should be as dense as the market will support, so
that as many people as possible can walk to downtown amenities
such as government facilities and restaurants. 155 This is especially
149. See Lewyn, supra note 143.
150. See LAKEWOOD, N.J., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 18, art. IX, §
902(B)(4)(a) (2005); see also Square Feet and Acres Converter, CALCULATOR SITE,
https://www.thecalculatorsite.com/conversions/area/square-feet-to-acres.php
[https://perma.cc/TQD3-LCGX] (last visited July 10, 2021) (enter 40,000 in the
“Value to convert” field and click “Convert” to yield an answer of 0.92 acres)
(showing that each acre is 43,560 square feet).
151. See
How
Many
Acres
Are
in
a
City
Block?,
REFERENCE*,
https://www.reference.com/geography/many-acres-city-block-c2e3daa4355c15a2
[https://perma.cc/B2EB-F9MW] (Mar. 26, 2020, 8:59 AM).
152. See Township of Lakewood, Amended Zoning Ordinance Map - 2017, ECODE360
(Apr. 2020), https://ecode360.com/attachment/LA4064/LA4064-018h%20Amended
%20Zoning%20Map.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3VM-LPYF] (showing that these zones
are especially common at the edge of town).
153. See LAKEWOOD, N.J., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 18, art. IX, §
902(B)(4)(a), (D)(4)(a), (E)(4)(a) (2005) (showing requirements for R20, R15, and
R12 zones).
154. See, e.g., Cafua Mgmt. Co. v. Sherman, No. 13 MISC 478544(GHP), 2016 WL
1178352, at *3 (Mass. Land Ct. Berkshire County Mar. 28, 2016) (noting that
downtown Pittsfield, Ma. “features high density, mixed-use buildings, and a
pedestrian-oriented streetscape”); Albuquerque Commons P’ship v. City of
Albuquerque, 149 P.3d 67, 71 (Ct. App. N.M. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 248
P.3d 856 (N.M. Supreme Ct. 2011) (“[An] urban center . . . is an area containing the
highest densities . . . .”).
155. Despite downtown Lakewood’s problems, it nevertheless is a significant shopping
district. See DiUlio, supra note 74; see Commute Map of 231 3rd Street, Lakewood,
NJ, 08701, WALK SCORE, https://www.walkscore.com/score/231-3rd-st-lakewood-
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true in Lakewood because the town’s major Jewish civic institution
(BMG) is a short walk from downtown; 156 thus, BMG students or
employees could live downtown and walk to school or work.
However, Lakewood’s zoning code significantly restricts housing
downtown. Downtown Lakewood is in the Central Business—or B2—zone. 157 One might think that a downtown of a growing city
should be full of taller-than-average buildings—but Lakewood limits
housing to twenty-two units per acre. 158 Buildings with this level of
density will usually have only two or three stories. 159
Similarly, Lakewood’s major yeshiva and employer are subject to
restrictive density rules. BMG is in the city’s Residential Office Park
(ROP) zone. 160 In this zone, the city allows only fifteen apartments
per acre, 161 and only 4.3 houses per acre. 162 Thus, zoning limits the
amount of housing within walking distance of BMG. The city’s
largest private sector employer, Georgian Court University, 163 is less

156.

157.

158.
159.

160.
161.

162.
163.

township-nj-08701 [https://perma.cc/NE7H-9GBF] (last visited June 25, 2021)
(showing fourteen restaurants of all types within half a mile of City Hall in downtown
Lakewood, as well as two grocers, two Judaica stores, and about a dozen other retail
stores). Of course, not every suburb has a downtown – but even in such suburbs, there
might be an area where dense development makes more sense, such as an area with a
concentration of shops or schools.
See Lakewood, NJ, GOOGLE MAPS, supra note 71 (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then
search starting point field for “Beth Medrash Govoha” and search destination field for
“Lakewood Municipal Office”) (BMG is only an 0.6 mile walk from City Hall.);
supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text (describing BMG).
See Township of Lakewood, Amended Zoning Ordinance Map - 2017, ECODE360
(Apr. 2020), https://ecode360.com/attachment/LA4064/LA4064-018h%20Amended
%20Zoning%20Map.pdf [https://perma.cc/L88H-A8EF]; LAKEWOOD, N.J., UNIFIED
DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 18, art. IX, § 903(B) (2005).
LAKEWOOD, N.J., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 18, art. IX, § 903(B)(5)(g)
(2005).
See Bob Bengford, Visualizing Compatible Density, THE URBANIST (May 4, 2017),
https://www.theurbanist.org/2017/05/04/visualizing-compatible-density/
[https://perma.cc/5D2U-42VY] (showing development with 15 units per acre
dominated by two- and three-story buildings).
See Township of Lakewood, supra note 152.
LAKEWOOD, N.J., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 18, art. IX, §§ 903(I)(1)(e),
902(H)(4)(b) (2005) (stating that multi-family housing is allowed, but only “in
accordance with the design regulations of the R-M District as specified in § 18902H4b" which sets a 15-unit limit).
Id. § 903(I)(2)(a), (I)(3)(a) (showing that single family houses and duplexes must
consume at least 10,000 square feet of land, or just under one fourth of an acre).
See Dave Lansing, Leading Employers in Ocean County, OCEAN CNTY. SCANNER
NEWS (July 16, 2019, 10:23 PM), https://ocscanner.news/2019/07/16/leadingemployers-in-ocean-county/ [https://perma.cc/NF5Y-HWYT].

62

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

than a mile from City Hall and several blocks from BMG, 164 yet is in
an R-12 zone, 165 where each house must occupy 12,000 square feet
of land, 166 and multifamily housing is prohibited. 167
Lakewood’s density caps may serve some public purpose. Often,
courts have justified such regulations as reducing traffic 168 or
somehow preserving a community’s rural or suburban atmosphere. 169
But such benefits may be outweighed by a variety of costs. As noted
above, sprawling development means that people have to drive or bus
their children across greater distances and have fewer opportunities
164. See Lakewood, NJ, GOOGLE MAPS, supra note 71 (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then
search starting point field for “Beth Medrash Govoha” and search destination field for
“Georgian Court University”); id. (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting
point field for “Lakewood Municipal Office” and search destination field for
“Georgian Court University”).
165. See Township of Lakewood, supra note 152; LAKEWOOD, N.J., UNIFIED
DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 18, art. IX, § 900(A)(5) (2005).
166. LAKEWOOD, N.J., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 18, art. IX, § 902(E)(4)(a)
(2005).
167. Id. § 902(E)(1)-(2) (showing that multifamily housing not on list of allowed uses).
168. See Padover v. Twp. of Farmington, 132 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Mich. 1965) (“More
freedom from noise and traffic might result” from large minimum lot sizes.) (citation
omitted). The Padover court listed a variety of other possible benefits from minimum
lot sizes, such as “safety from fire and other dangers . . . [and] transportation, water,
light, sewer and other necessities.” Id. However, the court did not cite any evidence
for its suggestion that large houses somehow prevent fire, because high-density places
do not necessarily have high levels of fire damage. See MARTY AHRENS, NAT’L FIRE
PROT. ASS’N, US FIRE DEATH RATES BY STATE 4 (Sept. 2019), https://www.nfpa.org///media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-and-reports/US-FireProblem/osstate.pdf [https://perma.cc/56WU-N9V6] (noting death rates from fires
higher in rural areas than in small towns, and higher in either than in large cities). In
fact, low-density development actually reduces the availability of transportation by
making public transit impossible, because such development means that fewer people
can live within walking distance of bus stops. Cf. Margaret E. Byerly, A Report to the
IPCC on Research Connecting Human Settlements, Infrastructure, and Climate
Change, 28 PACE ENV’T. L. REV. 936, 943–44 (2011) (arguing frequent transit service
is only practical in areas with fifteen or more dwelling units per acre; areas with four
or five units per acre suitable for minimal transit service). Moreover, low-density
development actually makes public utilities more expensive and thus more difficult to
provide, because where development expands into the countryside, more
infrastructure is necessary than would otherwise be the case. See Daniel J. Hutch, The
Rationale for Including Disadvantaged Communities in the Smart Growth
Metropolitan Development Framework, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 353, 360 (2002)
(“Sprawling development patterns require expensive investments in sewer, water and
road extensions . . . it may cost twice as much to service utilities in low-density
developments.”).
169. See, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261–62 (1980) (zoning ordinance allowing
only one house per acre justified by need to protect suburb’s residents “from the ill
effects of urbanization” and by the need to provide for “open-space areas”).
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to walk. 170 As a result, such development leads to more car crashes,
less exercise, more pollution, and increased costs for vehicle use and
school busing. 171
Moreover, density restrictions near downtown create negative side
effects that sprawl-producing regulation in suburbs do not. Antidensity zoning contributes to downtown Lakewood’s limited supply
of shops, jobs, and other amenities. If more people lived downtown,
more consumers could support more downtown shops, and
downtown Lakewood would come to resemble the bustling business
districts of Brooklyn’s Haredi neighborhoods, which have dozens of
Judaica stores and kosher supermarkets. 172 Thus, towns like
Lakewood should substantially revise their zoning codes to allow
taller, denser residential buildings downtown. Similarly, cities should
allow small-lot housing and more multifamily housing near major
universities and employers, such as BMG and Georgian Court, so
that students and employees can walk to school and work. 173
Even anti-density regulation at the edge of town is not harmless.
Such regulation restricts the amount of available housing within
Lakewood’s city limits and, as a result, such rules are likely to both
raise housing costs in Lakewood 174 and shift development to suburbs
near Lakewood, thus increasing Haredi/non-Haredi conflict in those
towns. 175 As people move from Lakewood to communities farther
away from Lakewood, they have to spend more money and time
driving, their children have to spend more time on school buses, and

170. See supra notes 83–89, 94–96 and accompanying text.
171. See supra Section II.A.
172. For example, Google Maps searches revealed that Borough Park has about fifteen
Judaica shops and fifteen grocers, while downtown Lakewood has just two of each.
See Lakewood, N.J., GOOGLE MAPS, supra note 71; Borough Park, Brooklyn, NY,
GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps [https://perma.cc/6H7S-D6RE] (last
visited October 8, 2021).
173. Lakewood and Kiryas Joel residents tend to have low incomes, and as a result, they
suffer more than other people by having to own a car to get to school. See supra notes
82–84 and accompanying text.
174. See Scott Beyer, More Building, Lower Prices: Census Data Makes the YIMBY Case,
MKT. URBANISM REP. (June 2, 2020), https://marketurbanismreport.com/blog/morebuilding-lower-prices-census-data-make-the-yimby-case
[https://perma.cc/6C762UEB] (showing places with fewer building permits tend to have higher housing
prices).
175. See supra notes 41–60 and accompanying text (discussing this argument in more
detail).
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their towns have to spend more money on busing their children to
school. 176
As noted above, much of Lakewood is zoned for between one and
four houses per acre. 177 Where houses are so thinly spread, almost
nothing is within walking distance of shops or jobs; the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency has suggested that a neighborhood
must have at least seven houses per acre (or roughly one house per
6,000 square feet) to support a corner store within walking distance,
and eighteen houses per acre (or roughly one house per 2,400 square
feet) to support a supermarket within walking distance. 178 It follows
that zoning codes that mandate such low densities may actually
increase traffic congestion and pollution, by forcing residents of lowdensity zones to drive to most destinations. 179
So, what should towns do instead? First of all, if towns like
Lakewood wish to revive their downtown, they should, at a
minimum, eliminate density restrictions downtown, or at least alter
those restrictions to allow more dwelling units. Second, if keeping
regional growth within town limits is a priority, cities should also
liberalize density restrictions in other parts of the city.
B. Single-Use Zoning
The most walkable places tend to have mixed uses—that is,
housing is on the same block, or even in the same building, as shops
and offices. 180 Mixed-use buildings increase walkability by enabling
their residents to walk to more commercial spaces. 181
176. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text (discussing these arguments in more
detail).
177. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
178. See LOCAL GOV'T COMM'N, CREATING GREAT NEIGHBORHOODS: DENSITY IN YOUR
COMMUNITY 4 (Sept. 2003), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201312/documents/density_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTV6-3G9S] (stating on the front page
that it is in “cooperation with U.S. EPA”). Obviously, many areas with far fewer than
eighteen housing units per acre have supermarkets, but those groceries are likely to be
supported by people driving from a variety of places, as opposed to neighborhood foot
traffic.
179. See supra note 93 (making similar points).
180. See Nolan Gray, Mixed Up Priorities for Mixed-Use Buildings, STRONG TOWNS (Jan.
9, 2018), https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2018/1/8/mixed-up-priorities-formixed-use-buildings [https://perma.cc/HHM2-CZ7K] (emphasis added) (Sometimes
“major cities require ground floor retail for apartments and offices.”).
181. Cf. Brent Pace, Advantages and Disadvantages of Mixed-Use Development, RES. FOR
ENTREPRENEURS,
https://www.gaebler.com/Advantages-And-Disadvantages-OfMixed-Use-Development.htm [https://perma.cc/RE6V-QPYP] (last visited July 13,
2021) (mixed-use development allows people to “live, work and play all in close
proximity”).
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By contrast, the Lakewood code states that in the downtown B-2
zone, “[c]ombined business and residential uses are hereby expressly
prohibited . . . .” 182 In other words, businesses and residential uses
can both be in downtown Lakewood, but they cannot share a
building. 183 This law both discourages housing downtown (since it
precludes commercial landlords from adding housing) and keeps
business out of downtown (because it precludes residential landlords
from adding shops or offices). 184 Thus, this law may reduce
downtown Lakewood’s population and job base, and thus creates the
same negative consequences as other regulations discussed above. 185
It logically follows that this provision should simply be eliminated
from the zoning code.
Single-use zoning also affects the rest of the city. Although there
may be a case for limiting traffic in low-density residential zones,
areas with major employers by definition already have a significant
amount of visitors and traffic; thus, such areas should accommodate a
wide variety of uses. But commercial uses are not allowed in R-12
zones, such as the zone including Georgian Court, 186 which reduces
the ability of Georgian Court’s hundreds of students and employees
to easily walk to shops or jobs. 187 Thus, towns should allow a broader
mix of uses near downtown and major employers such as Georgian
Court.
C. A Setback for Pedestrians
Generally, the Lakewood zoning code, like many zoning codes,
often requires that both housing and nonresidential uses be set back
far from the street. For example, BMG is in the R-OP zone, where
structures must be set back twenty-five feet from the street, and no
structure may encompass more than twenty-five percent of a lot. 188 In
other parts of town, these rules are more restrictive: for example, in a
“highway business zone,” buildings must be fifty feet away from the
182. LAKEWOOD, N.J., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 18, art. IX, § 903(B)(1)(a)
(2020).
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See supra Section III.A.
186. ch. 18, art. IX, §§ 902(E)(1)–(2) (neither multifamily housing nor commerce is on list
of allowed uses). As noted above, Georgian Court is the city's largest private
employer. See Lansing, supra note 163.
187. Similarly, BMG is, as noted above, in the R-OP zone, where retail is not on the list of
permitted uses- though a wide variety of professional occupations are allowed. See ch.
18, art. IX, § 903(I)(1); Township of Lakewood, supra note 152.
188. ch. 18, art. IX § 903(I)(2).
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street. 189 Even downtown, housing must be set back twenty feet from
the street (if multifamily) 190 or twenty-five feet otherwise. 191 Land
that is set back from the street is typically used for lawns or parking
rather than being attractively landscaped. 192
Although the land used for setbacks is not entirely wasted, it is
nevertheless land that could be used for housing, and thus plays a
minor role in reducing citywide housing supply. In addition, setback
regulations inconvenience pedestrians by forcing them to walk
through a parking lot or similar buffer zone to reach their apartments,
shops, and jobs. Although a twenty-five-foot setback may only take a
few seconds to walk through, these sometimes-empty spaces may be
less appealing than a quick walk from sidewalk to store. 193 Defenders
of setbacks argue that setbacks make streets seem less crowded, 194
but pedestrians actually benefit from the shade and the sense of
enclosure created by buildings that are near a sidewalk. 195
Admittedly, some buildings, especially in automobile-oriented
blocks on the fringe of the city, need large amounts of parking, and
189. Id. § 903(C)(3)(c).
190. Id. § 903(B)(5)(d).
191. Id. § 903(B)(4)(c). Similarly, structures must be set back twenty feet from other
buildings on the rear and side as well. Id. § 903(B)(3)(a)–(b) (for commercial
structures, rear yard setback of ten feet, side yard setback of seven feet); id. §
903(B)(5)(e), (f) (for multifamily structures, twenty-foot rear and side yard setbacks).
Although rear and side setbacks arguably waste land, they do not degrade the
pedestrian environment to the same extent as do front setbacks. See infra notes 192–
95 and accompanying text (explaining why front setbacks create environments that
are unappealing for pedestrians).
192. See JOSH STEPHENS, THE URBAN MYSTIQUE: NOTES ON CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES,
AND BEYOND 154 (2020); Chad D. Emerson, Making Main Street Legal Again: The
SmartCode Solution to Sprawl, 71 MO. L. REV. 637, 645 n.36 (2006). Under
conventional American zoning codes “front setbacks must be either a 25-foot grass
yard or a paved parking lot.” Id.
193. Cf. Douglas G. French, Cities Without Soul: Standards for Architectural Controls
with Growth Management Objectives, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 267, 280 (1994)
(suggesting that pedestrians find places without setbacks more aesthetically appealing
because, if properly designed, they “provide more interesting scenery . . . and create a
feeling of connection between the buildings and the public spaces bordering them”).
194. See STEPHENS, supra note 192, at 154 (“Received wisdom holds that setbacks make
urban spaces feel less crowded. They supposedly ensure that buildings do not
overshadow streets and sidewalks.”).
195. Id. at 155; see, e.g., The Haredi Neighborhoods of Zikhrom Moshe and Meah
Shearim, IN AND AROUND JERUSALEM, https://inandaroundjerusalem.com/
summary_of_walks_in_jerusalem/the_haredi_neighborhoods_of_zikhron_moshe_and
_meah_shearim [https://perma.cc/L4G8-EBH6] (last visited July 8, 2020)
(referencing photo of Malchei Israel, a shady Jerusalem Haredi neighborhood with no
setbacks).
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thus will be set back from the street as long as the law allows it. This
choice, however, should be left up to individual landowners because
of the unpleasant side effects of setback rules.
D. Minimum Parking Requirements
The Lakewood code requires businesses to provide significant
amounts of off-street parking. For example, most retail activities
must provide one space for every 200 square feet of floor area, 196 that
is, 5 per 1,000 square feet. Because a parking space can take up 330
square feet of land, 197 this means that retail businesses must devote
more land to parking than to their stores. By contrast, some American
municipalities require two or fewer spaces. 198 Residential
developments typically require between 0.8 and two parking spaces
per bedroom. 199 Such “minimum parking requirements” are
widespread in the United States, and often require far more parking
than renters or customers actually use. 200

196. See LAKEWOOD, N.J., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE ch. 18, art. VIII, §
807(B)(1).
197. See DONALD SHOUP, PARKING AND THE CITY 9 (2018).
198. See, e.g., Sara Schindler, The Future of Abandoned Big Box Stores: Legal Solutions to
the Legacies of Poor Planning Decisions, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 471, 482 (2012)
(Seattle requires two parking spaces per 1,000 square feet of retail); see also Michael
Lewyn, Sprawl in Canada and the United States, 44 URB. LAW. 85, 121 (2012) (two
Atlanta suburbs require two spaces per 1000 feet or fewer).
199. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 5:21-4.14 (2021) (referencing Table 4.4 illustrating that in
New Jersey, parking standards for housing are set by state government, for a garden
apartment, 1.8 spaces are required for one-bedroom apartments, and 2.0 are required
for two-bedroom apartments, and for high-rise apartments, only 0.8 spaces are
required for a one-bedroom apartment and 1.3 for a two-bedroom apartment). Two
municipalities have obtained state permission for differing standards; however,
Lakewood is not one of them. See Residential Site Improvement Standards, STATE OF
N.J. DEP’T OF CMTY. AFFS., https://nj.gov/dca/divisions/codes/offices/rsis.html
[https://perma.cc/6KZV-X7YU] (last visited July 13, 2021).
200. See METRO BOSTON PERFECT PARKING FIT INITIATIVE, METRO. AREA PLAN. COUNCIL
20–21 (Feb. 2017), https://perfectfitparking.mapc.org/uploads/FINAL_Metro
%20Boston%20Perfect%20Fit%20Parking%20Initiative%20Report_2-3-17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5E6-JV34] (charting a survey of apartments in several Boston
suburbs showed that parking demand per unit was consistently below parking supply;
roughly one in four spaces were unused); Alan Durning, Wide Open Spaces: How
Unused Parking Adds Up, GRIST (July 28, 2013), https://grist.org/cities/wide-openspaces-how-unused-parking-adds-up/ [https://perma.cc/87CZ-77JK] (In one Oregon
suburb, “barely half of legally required spaces had cars in them . . . .”); cf. Donald C.
Shoup, Truth in Transportation Planning, 6 J. TRANSP. & STAT. 1, 4 (2003),
http://shoup.bol.ucla.edu/TruthInTransportationPlanning.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP7M-
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These regulations make driving more convenient, and arguably are
not particularly harmful in the least walkable places, where every
conceivable errand involves a car. But in more foot-friendly areas
such as downtowns, parking requirements have several negative side
effects.
First, parking requirements reduce the land available for housing,
thus reducing the housing supply and increasing housing costs. This
is the case because every inch of land used for parking cannot be
used for housing. For example, if a landowner creates a building with
22 two-bedroom units per acre (the maximum allowed in
Lakewood’s downtown zone) 201 and each unit has two parking
spaces, 202 this means that 14,520 square feet of the acre must be
devoted to parking—about one-third of the land. 203 Admittedly, a
landowner can use the same land for both housing and parking if they
build a parking garage above or below the housing. However,
parking garages are more expensive than surface parking lots. A
downtown underground parking lot typically costs a landowner
$40,000 per space in capital costs, eight times the cost of a surface
parking lot. 204
Second, these costs make every kind of good or service more
expensive. For example, the cost of required parking increases the
cost of building a shopping center in Los Angeles by sixty-seven
percent. 205 These costs may be passed on to homebuyers, renters, and
customers through higher residential and commercial rents. 206

201.
202.
203.

204.

205.
206.

PYBE] (criticizing technical assumptions used to justify number of parking spaces
required by municipal codes).
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See supra note 199 and accompanying text (stating that the state requires two parking
spaces per two-bedroom garden apartment).
I calculate as follows: if each space consumes 330 square feet, and each unit requires
two spaces, that means each unit requires 660 square feet of parking. See SHOUP,
supra note 197, at 9 (parking spaces require 330 square feet of land). Six hundred
sixty square feet multiplied by twenty-two units equals 14,520 square feet of parking,
or one-third of an acre. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS, supra note
137, at 360 (noting an acre is 43,560 square feet).
See Eric Bethany, Read: Richard Willson, “Case Against Minimum Parking
(July
7,
2015),
Requirements”,
KRONBERG URBANISTS ARCHITECTS
https://www.kronbergua.com/post/read-richard-willson-case-against-minimumparking-requirements [https://perma.cc/D59V-UTZR].
See SHOUP, supra note 197, at 6 (adding that if parking spaces underground, costs
increase by ninety-three percent).
Id. It could be argued that because demand for housing and office space is not
unlimited, costs are not in fact passed on to consumers. This claim overlooks the fact
that a regulation that raises costs might eliminate the cheapest houses or offices from
a market. For example, suppose that construction and land costs for an apartment are
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Third, minimum parking requirements reduce business activity;
just as every inch of land used for surface parking cannot be used for
housing, such land also cannot be used for shops or other land uses.
In a suburban part of town where land is cheap or undeveloped, a
landowner might be able to easily comply with parking requirements
and still build whatever they want. This is less likely in a downtown,
where buildings are more likely to be surrounded by other buildings
whose occupants might not wish them to be knocked down. 207
Admittedly, parking lots provide some economic value; however,
there is no reason to believe that municipal planners know more than
businesses do about the “right” amount of parking for each individual
shop or apartment building. 208
Fourth, landowners often comply with minimum parking
requirements by placing parking in front of buildings, either to place
something useful in the setback area required by municipal setback
regulations, 209 or to make their business more appealing to
motorists. 210 But large surface parking lots force walkers to waste
time walking through car-filled parking lots to reach their ultimate

207.

208.

209.
210.

$900 per apartment per month with minimum parking requirements, and $800 without
such requirements. Even if the requirements do not affect what tenants are willing to
pay, they ensure that apartments costing less than $900 are unprofitable to construct,
and thus not placed on the market. See Alan Durning, Apartment Blockers,
STREETSBLOG USA (Sept. 16, 2013), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2013/09/16/
apartment-blockers/ [https://perma.cc/KH4M-WRAJ].
See Clinton Edminster, Opinion, Clinton Edminster Column: Parking Regulations
Stunt Commercial Growth, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS (Mar. 4, 2020, 1:31 PM),
https://www.savannahnow.com/opinion/20200304/clinton-edminster-column-parkingregulations-stunt-commercial-growth [https://perma.cc/3U28-AE54] (citing example
of landowner who would like to turn offices into restaurant, but to change use and
comply with law, he would “need to provide over 16 off-street parking spaces” which
in turn would require him to “buy the two-story house behind the property, tear it
down, and turn the entire lot into parking”); Millburn Courtyard Assocs. v. Planning
Bd. of Millburn, 2006 WL 1413698, at *2–4 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 23, 2006)
(complying with minimum parking requirements meant the business would have had
to destroy nearby buildings to establish restaurant).
See Bethany, supra note 204. It could be argued that minimum parking requirements
prevent businesses from “free riding” on each other’s parking; for example, in the
absence of such requirements, business A might provide lots of parking and business
B may refuse to provide any because its customers will walk from business A to
business B. As a result, business A would spend money on parking that business B
benefits from. Although this scenario seems harmful to business A, it may still be less
harmful to A than the negative side effects discussed above. Id.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
See Bethany, supra note 204.
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destination—a task that might be boring and unpleasant at best. 211
Thus, minimum parking requirements reduce a downtown’s appeal to
walkers, which in turn might make it less desirable generally.
By making walking more unpleasant and increasing driving,
minimum parking requirements might increase air pollution from
motor vehicles. 212 In addition, every inch of land devoted to parking
also increases water pollution. Parking spaces collect runoff, such as
leaking oil from cars and fluids. 213 Rain causes this runoff to travel
from parking spaces into rivers and streams, thus impeding water
quality. 214
If municipal parking requirements create so many economic and
environmental harms, why should they exist at all? One traditional
argument for such rules is that by giving drivers a guaranteed place to
park, they prevent “cruising”—drivers wasting time and fuel
searching for an on-street parking space. 215 Thus, one might argue
that minimum parking requirements make downtowns less congested
and polluted. On the other hand, by encouraging driving and
discouraging walking, these regulations might create more
congestion than they eliminate.
Moreover, minimum parking requirements are not the only way to
prevent cruising. If on-street parking is priced at a rate that deters the
least motivated drivers, there will usually be one or two spaces
available per block, and cruising will be unnecessary. 216 Although
appropriately priced parking might deter a few motorists from

211.
212.
213.
214.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See Douglas A. Miltenberger, Comment, Development on the Banks of the Letort
Spring Run: What Can Be Done to Save Pennsylvania’s Waterways from Post
Construction Stormwater Runoff, 11 PENN ST. ENV’T L. REV. 127, 127–30 (2002)
(describing water impairment from runoff); cf. Chanapa Tantibanchachai, More
Pavement, More Problems, HUB (Mar. 5, 2020), https://hub.jhu.edu/
2020/03/05/urbanization-increases-annual-flooding/ [https://perma.cc/LQ72-F4DX]
(explaining how increases in roads, parking lots, and other paved surfaces increase
flooding).
215. See Stroud v. City of Aspen, 532 P.2d 720, 723 (Colo. 1975) (Municipal parking
requirements prevent motorists from “moving slowly around block after block
seeking a place to park . . . clog[ging] the streets, air and ears of our citizens.”).
216. See Donald Shoup, Pricing the Curb: Taking the Lottery Feel Out of Curb Use by
Finding the Right Prices, PARKING & MOBILITY, Apr. 2020, at 24, 25–26,
https://issuu.com/theparkingprofessional/docs/pm_2020_04_issuu
[https://perma.cc/T272-RT4G].

2021]

Bringing Judaism Downtown

71

visiting, it also would eliminate cruising without creating the antidevelopment side effects of minimum parking requirements. 217
The modern trend has been to abolish minimum parking
requirements—mostly downtown and occasionally citywide. 218 This
does not mean that all parking would be eliminated; developers could
still build enough parking to meet customer and resident demand but
would not be forced by the government to build more than that
amount. This trend is not limited to large cities with huge mass
transit systems. For example, Hartford, Connecticut (a city roughly
the size of Lakewood) 219 eliminated minimum parking requirements
for its downtown in 2015 and extended this change to the rest of the
city in 2017. 220
Although it is too early to see how successful these experiments
have been, there is at least some evidence that more modest
experiments with parking reform might be good for development. In
1999, Los Angeles enacted an “adaptive reuse ordinance” that
exempted downtown buildings from minimum parking requirements
as long as their owners converted vacant commercial spaces into

217. Id. at 25. It could be argued that turning free parking into paid parking is politically
unpalatable. One solution to this problem is creating “parking benefit districts” in
which parking meter revenue could be used to fund public services in the metered
areas, so that residents and visitors of these areas could easily see their meter money
at work. Donald Shoup, Parking Benefit Districts, ACCESS, Fall 2016, at 35,
https://www.accessmagazine.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2016/11/access49-webalmanac.pdf [https://perma.cc/T272-RT4G].
218. See Ending Parking Minimums, STRONG TOWNS, https://www.strongtowns.org/
parking [https://perma.cc/XLS9-P7AH] (last visited July 28, 2021) (referencing
crowd-sourced map showing the removal of parking minimums across the country);
Jeffrey Spivak, People Over Parking: Planners are Reevaluating Parking
Requirements for Affordable Housing, AM. PLANNING ASS’N (Oct. 2018),
https://www.planning.org/planning/2018/oct/peopleoverparking/
[https://perma.cc/3R7W-GVL5]; Henry Grabar, San Francisco Legalizes Itself, SLATE
(Dec. 18, 2018, 5:10 PM), https://slate.com/business/2018/12/san-franciscoeliminates-parking-minimums-its-a-trend.html [https://perma.cc/9SMT-CDF3]; Paul
Barter, Which Cities Have Abolished Parking Minimums, REINVENTING PARKING
(Sept. 9, 2013), https://www.reinventingparking.org/2013/09/which-cities-haveabolished-parking.html [https://perma.cc/KY7L-J3XK] (citing numerous examples in
Europe and Asia).
219. See Sara C. Bronin, Comprehensive Rezonings, 2019 BYU L. REV. 725, 737 (2019)
(showing Hartford population of 123,000); Willis & Barchenger, supra note 131
(Lakewood population just over 100,000).
220. Angie Schmitt, Hartford Eliminates Parking Minimums Citywide, STREETSBLOG USA
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2017/12/13/hartford-eliminates-parkingminimums-citywide [https://perma.cc/U895-K6G5].
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housing. 221 Developers used this ordinance to build 6,900 housing
units downtown between 1999 and 2008—more than seventy-five
percent of downtown’s new housing supply. 222 Thus, it appears that
when freed from minimum parking requirements, landowners might
build more housing than they otherwise would.
Thus, a town that (like Lakewood) wishes to increase its housing
supply might wish to eliminate its minimum parking requirements,
especially in downtown and commercial areas near downtown. 223
IV. CONCLUSION
Many of the goals of the smart growth movement are important for
all municipalities, because all towns benefit when walking is easier
and traffic injuries are reduced. 224 However, Haredi-dominated towns
have a greater interest than most municipalities in funneling
population growth into their current borders, because the alternative
to this form of development is for Haredim to spread into nearby
towns, creating costly (though often ultimately successful) conflict
and litigation with their new neighbors. 225
These towns can concentrate new housing within their borders by
eliminating regulations that limit new housing, such as density
regulations, 226 minimum parking and setback requirements, 227 and
rules that exclude mixed-use development. 228 If they follow these
policies, there will be fewer conflicts between Haredim and other
municipalities. 229

221. Michael Manville, Parking Requirements and Housing Development: Regulation and
Spring
2014,
at
2,
4,
Reform
in
Los
Angeles,
ACCESS,
http://www.accessmagazine.org/spring-2014/parking-requirements-housingdevelopment-regulation-reform-los-angeles/ [https://perma.cc/95KH-FB99].
222. Id.
223. In more vehicle-dependent areas far from downtown, most landowners would
probably build large parking lots even if government did not require it. Thus, some of
the costs of minimum parking requirements (such as a degraded pedestrian
environment) are less relevant. Even so, these requirements might require developers
to use somewhat more land than necessary, thus driving up the cost of doing business—so I favor parking deregulation even outside downtown. However, the impact of
such development in suburban areas may be quite small, so deregulating downtown
parking is a more valuable reform.
224. See supra Section II.B.2.
225. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Section III.A.
227. See supra Section III.C.–D.
228. See supra Section III.B.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 6–10.

